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This page exists for one question: your client asks whether a signature applied in Coalesc is valid. It collects what Revenu Québec and the Canada Revenue Agency publish on the subject, links every source, and states what Coalesc does about each requirement.
Coalesc holds no certification and claims none. This page reports published policy; it is not legal advice. Validating any tool for your practice remains yours to do, which is also the Ordre des CPA du Québec’s stated position.
Quotations are kept in the language each regulator published them in. Revenu Québec writes in French, the CRA in English; translating either would weaken the quote. Each French quotation is followed by an English gloss in brackets.

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There is no approved-provider list

This comes first, because the opposite belief is widespread. Neither Revenu Québec nor the CRA publishes a list of approved electronic signature vendors. What exists federally, and what this is usually confused with, is the list of EFILE-certified software (an unrelated matter) and a list of forms on which an electronic signature is accepted. The CRA states it plainly:
Electronic filers can also offer signature solutions of their choice that operate or function independently of EFILE software.
The requirement is on the method, never on the vendor.

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Revenu Québec: four accepted types

RQ accepts four types of electronic signature (source):

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The two types Coalesc offers

On the signing page, the client chooses between two modes (the page is shown in the client’s language; the French labels are « Dessiner » and « Écrire »):
  • Draw: they trace their signature with a finger or a mouse. This is the second type, the handwritten signature applied with a technological device, which RQ describes without attaching any additional condition. It is the default mode.
  • Type: they type their name, which Coalesc renders in cursive script. For RQ this is a typed signature (signature dactylographiée), the fourth type, and RQ’s conditions for that type apply (above and below).
The firm cannot turn off the Type mode, and the record does not state which mode was used: the image placed in the document shows it (a cursive name or a drawn stroke). If a form must carry a drawn signature, ask the client before sending the link, and look at the signed copy before you pass it on. RQ does not define what a “secure channel” is on this page. Coalesc does not claim that its signing link is one in RQ’s sense.

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When you are the one submitting the form

RQ attaches a specific condition to the typed signature when the form is submitted by someone other than the taxpayer, that is, by you on your client’s behalf:
Si le formulaire est transmis par une autre personne que vous […], la signature dactylographiée n’est acceptée que si un certificat d’authenticité est fourni avec le formulaire. […] Ce certificat comprend des renseignements comme la date, l’heure et les détails de la signature du formulaire.
(When the form is submitted by someone other than the taxpayer, a typed signature is accepted only if a certificate of authenticity is provided with the form, carrying information such as the date, time and details of the signature.) The passage names the typed signature only, which in Coalesc means the Type mode. What Coalesc does: every signed document carries an Electronic signature record (Relevé de signature électronique) added inside the PDF, not as a separate attachment. It holds:
  • each signer’s name and email address;
  • the time of each signature, with the IP address and browser used;
  • a timestamped trail of events: request created, link sent, document opened, consent given, signature applied;
  • the SHA-256 fingerprint of the document presented for signature.
Times are printed to the millisecond, with the offset from UTC. Before signing, the client ticks a consent statement: “I agree to sign this document electronically and confirm this signature is mine.” (in French: « J’accepte de signer ce document par voie électronique et je confirme que cette signature est la mienne. »). The record logs it as Consent given. The record is bound into the document because an evidence file that travels separately stops being evidence the first time somebody saves the attachment on its own. Whether this record stands in for the certificate of authenticity RQ describes is your call to make.

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The integrity obligation

This is the only obligation RQ attaches to every signature type, and it is the important one:
Vous devez prendre toutes les mesures nécessaires afin d’assurer et de maintenir l’intégrité du formulaire, et ce, tout au long de son cycle de vie. Nous nous réservons le droit d’exiger le formulaire technologique original dûment signé.
(You must take every necessary measure to ensure and maintain the integrity of the form throughout its lifecycle. RQ reserves the right to require the original signed technology-based document.) It is the administrative echo of section 39 of Quebec’s Act to establish a legal framework for information technology, whose second paragraph conditions a document’s enforceability on its integrity being assured. What Coalesc does: the record prints the SHA-256 fingerprint of the document as it was presented for signature, that is, the original PDF, before the signatures and the record were added. The finished signed file has its own fingerprint too, kept with the request, but it is not printed on the record: it could not be, since the record is part of the file it would describe.

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Checking the fingerprint

The printed fingerprint is therefore compared against the original document, as you sent it for signature, not against the signed copy. The signed copy also contains the signatures and the record, so its fingerprint is necessarily different.
  1. Take the original PDF, the one you picked in the Document step of the request (it stays in the mandate).
  2. Compute its fingerprint:
  1. Compare the result with the Fingerprint of the document presented (SHA-256) line on the record. If they match, the document the client saw and signed is that one.
A fingerprint demonstrates that a file has been altered; it does not make a document tamper-proof. It is worth exactly as much as the trust placed in the record of that fingerprint. A trusted third-party timestamp or a document-signing certificate removes that dependency: Coalesc uses neither today, and does not pretend otherwise.

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The forms covered

RQ marks this form by form: open the form number in the list of forms and look for the electronic signature note. The CRA instead publishes a closed list. Eleven forms appear on it (source, modified 19 May 2026): When you prepare a signature request, Coalesc looks for the signature pages in the return and names the form. This detection recognises ten of these eleven forms: T2200 is deliberately left out, because the employer signs it. It also recognises Revenu Québec’s TP-1000. It is written for PDFs produced by DT Max; on a PDF from other software it may find nothing, and you place the boxes yourself.

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The CRA’s conditions on the method

The CRA expects identity verification by the party receiving the signed form, then one of three routes:
  • the signature is applied in person, in the presence of the other party, “using methods such as a stylus or finger on a tablet”;
  • or the form is sent to the electronic address most recently provided for that purpose;
  • or through “an access controlled, secured electronic location” that is accessible to the individual only because the other party granted that access.
What Coalesc does: signing happens remotely, through a link. Coalesc does not offer in-person signing on a firm tablet. Each signer receives their own link, valid for 30 days, sent from your firm’s email address to the address you entered for them. That link is the only thing that opens the signing page. It therefore protects the signature exactly as well as the mailbox it lands in: anyone with access to that mailbox can sign. Coalesc does not verify the identity of whoever opens the link. The identity verification the CRA asks for, and choosing an address only the signer reads, are the firm’s responsibility. Which of the CRA’s routes your use follows is also yours to decide. The CRA separately recommends masking the first five digits of the SIN when a form is printed or generated. That is a recommendation rather than a requirement, and it applies to the SIN only.

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What this page does not say

  • It does not say Coalesc is approved, certified or endorsed. None of those exist for a vendor.
  • It does not say Coalesc’s signing link is a “secure channel” in RQ’s sense, nor that it satisfies one of the CRA’s routes on its own.
  • It does not say Coalesc verifies signers’ identity. It does not.
  • It does not say a signed document is tamper-proof.
  • It does not replace your own validation, nor legal advice.

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Sources